Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for sustaining mutual cooperation in repeated social dilemma games, where a player would keep cooperation to avoid being retaliated by a co-player in the future. So-called zero-determinant (ZD) strategies enable a player to unilaterally set a linear relationship between the player's own payoff and the co-player's payoff regardless of the strategy of the co-player. In the present study, we analytically study zerodeterminant strategies in finitely repeated (two-person) prisoner's dilemma games with a general payoff matrix. Our results are as follows. First, we present the forms of solutions that extend the known results for infinitely repeated games (with a discount factor w of unity) to the case of finitely repeated games (0 < w < 1). Second, for the three representative ZD strategies, we derive the threshold value of w above which the ZD strategies exist. Third, we show that the only strategies that enforce a linear relationship between the two players' payoffs are either the ZD strategies or unconditional strategies, where the latter independently cooperates with a fixed probability in each round of the game, proving a conjecture previously made for infinitely repeated games.
Introduction
The prisoner's dilemma game models situations in which two individuals are involved in a social dilemma and each individual selects either cooperation (C) and defection (D) in the simplest setting. Although an individual obtains a larger payoff by selecting D regardless of the choice of the other individual, mutual defection, which is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game, yields a smaller benefit to both players than mutual cooperation does. We now know various mechanisms that enable mutual cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game and other social dilemma games [1] [2] [3] , which inform us how cooperation is probably sustained in society of humans and animals and how to design cooperative organisations and society.
One of the mechanisms enabling mutual cooperation in social dilemma games is direct reciprocity, i.e., repeated interaction, in which the same two individuals play the game multiple times. An individual that defects would be retaliated by the co-player in the succeeding rounds. Therefore, the rational decision for both players in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is to keep mutual cooperation if the number of iteration is sufficiently large [1, 4, 5] . Generous tit-for-tat [6] and win-stay lose-shift (often called Pavlov) [7, 8] strategies are strong competitors in evolutionary dynamics of the repeated prisoner's dilemma game under noise, and a population composed of them realizes a high level of mutual cooperation.
In 2012, when the study of direct reciprocity seemed to be matured, Press and Dyson proposed a novel strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game, called the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy [9] . ZD strategies impose a linear relationship between the payoff obtained by a focal individual and its co-player regardless of the strategy that the co-player implements. A special case of the ZD strategies is the equalizer, with which the focal individual unilaterally determines the payoff that the co-player gains regardless of what the co-player does, within a permitted range of the co-player's payoff value (see [2, 10] for the previous accounts for this strategy). As a different special case, the focal individual can set an "extortionate" share of the payoff that the individual gains as compared to the co-player's payoff. The advent of the ZD strategies has spurred new lines of investigations of direct reciprocity. They include the examination and extension of ZD strategies such as their evolution [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , multiplayer games [20, [23] [24] [25] [26] , continuous action spaces [25] [26] [27] [28] , alternating games [28] , human reactions to computerized ZD strategies [29, 30] , and human-human experiments [25, 31] .
Most of the aforementioned mathematical and computational studies of the ZD strategies have been conducted under the assumption of infinitely repeated games. While mathematically more elegant and advantageous, finitely repeated games are more realistic than infinitely repeated games and comply with experimental studies. In the present study, we examine the ZD strategies in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game.
There are a few studies that have investigated ZD strategies in finitely repeated games. Hilbe and colleagues defined and mathematically characterized ZD strategies in finitely repeated games [32] (also see [29] ). McAvoy and Hauert analyzed ZD strategies in the finitely repeated donation game (i.e., a special case of the prisoner's dilemma game) in a continuous strategy space [27, 28] . Given these studies, our main contributions in the present article are summarized as follows. First, we derive expressions of the ZD strategies in finitely repeated games that are straightforward extensions of those previously found for the infinitely repeated game. Second, for the three most studied ZD strategies, we derive the threshold discount factor (i.e., how likely the next round of the game occurs in the finitely repeated game) above which the ZD strategy can exist. Third, we prove that imposing a linear relationship between the two individuals' payoffs implies that the focal player takes either the ZD strategy defined for finitely repeated games [32] or an unconditional strategy (e.g., unilateral cooperation and unilateral defection), proving the conjecture in [15] in the case of finitely repeated games.
Preliminaries
In this section, we explain the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game, the strategies of interest (i.e., memoryone strategies), and the expected payoffs. More thorough discussion of them is found in Refs. [2, 32, 33] .
We consider the symmetric two-person prisoner's dilemma game whose payoff matrix is given by
The entries represent the payoffs that the focal player, denoted by X, gains in a single round of a repeated game. Each row and column represents the action of the focal player, X, and the co-player (denoted by Y ), respectively. We assume that T > R > P > S,
which dictates the prisoner's dilemma game. Both players obtain a larger payoff by selecting D than C because T > R and P > S. We also assume that 2R > T + S,
which guarantees that mutual cooperation is more beneficial than the two players alternating C and D in the opposite phase, i.e., CD, DC, CD, DC, . . ., where the first and second letter represent the actions selected by X and Y , respectively [5, 34] . The two players repeat the game whose payoff matrix in each round is given by Eq. (1). A next round given the current round takes place with probability w (0 < w < 1), which is called the discount factor. Consider two players X and Y that adopt memory-one strategies, with which they use only the outcome of the last round to decide the action to be submitted in the current round. A memory-one strategy is specified by a 5-tuple; X's strategy is given by a combination of
and p 0 , where 0 ≤ p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD , p 0 ≤ 1. In Eq. (4), p CC is the conditional probability that X cooperates when both X and Y cooperated in the last round, p CD is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X cooperated and Y defected in the last round, p DC is the conditional probability that X cooperates when X defected and Y cooperated in the last round, and p DD is the conditional probability that X cooperates when both X and Y defected in the last round. Finally, p 0 is the probability that X cooperates in the first round. Similarly, Y 's strategy is specified by a combination of
and the probability to cooperate in the first round, q 0 , where 0 ≤ q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD , q 0 ≤ 1.
We refer to the first round of the repeated game as round 0. Because both players have been assumed to use a memory-one strategy, the stochastic state of the two players in round t (t ≥ 0) is specified by
where v CC (t) is the probability that both players cooperate in round t, v CD is the probability that X cooperates and Y defects, and so forth. The normalization is given by v CC (t) + v CD (t) + v DC (t) + v DD (t) = 1 (t = 0, 1, . . .).
The initial condition is given by
Because the expected payoff to player X in round t is given by v(t)S ⊤ X , where
the expected per-round payoff to player X in the repeated game is given by
The transition-probability matrix for v(t) is given by
By substituting
in Eq. (9), one obtains
where I is the 4 × 4 identity matrix. Similarly, the expected per-round payoff to player Y is given by
where
3 Results
We search player X's strategies that impose a linear relationship between the two players' payoffs, i.e.,
When α = 0, we set χ = −β/α and κ = −γ/(α + β) to transform Eq. (15) to
Equalizer

Expression
By definition, the equalizer unilaterally sets the co-player's payoff, π Y , to a constant value irrespectively of the co-player's strategy [2, 9, 10] . To derive an expression for the equalizer strategies in the finitely repeated game, we derive necessary conditions and then show that the derived conditions are sufficient. Because the equalizer is equivalent to α = 0 in Eq. (15) and hence not covered by Eq. (16), we proceed as follows.
We start by rewriting Eq. (13) as follows:
We denote u eq when Y 's strategy is q = (0, 0, 0, 0) by u eq,0000 . Note that u eq,0000 is independent of the probability that Y cooperates in the initial round, i.e., q 0 . We obtain u eq,0000 = 1
We denote by π Y,0000 the payoff of Y when q = (0, 0, 0, 0), which is given by
Similarly, we denote u eq when Y 's strategy is q = (1, 1, 1, 1) by u eq,1111 . We obtain
We denote by π Y,1111 the payoff of Y when q = (1, 1, 1, 1), which is given by
If X is equalizer, π Y,0000 = π Y,1111 must hold true regardless of q 0 . Therefore, we obtain
(1 − w) p 0 q 0 u eq,0000 1 
Equation (24) 
Equations (25) and (26) lead to the following necessary conditions:
and p CC , p DD , and p 0 are arbitrary under the constraint 0 ≤ p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD , p 0 ≤ 1. Equations (27) and (28) extend the results previously obtained for w = 1 [9] . Equations (27) and (28) are sufficient conditions. To verify this, we substitute
and q = (q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD ) in Eq. (18) to obtain
which does not contain q. By substituting Eq. (30) in Eq. (17), we obtain
which is independent of q and q 0 . Therefore, the set of the equalizer strategies is given by Eq. (29), where 0 ≤ p CC , p CD , p DC , p DD ≤ 1, combined with any 0 ≤ p 0 ≤ 1. It should be noted that an equalizer does not require any condition on p 0 . However, Eq. (31) indicates that the payoff that an equalizer enforces on the co-player, π Y , depends on the value of p 0 . Because Eq. (31) is a weighted average of P and R with positive weights, an equalizer can impose any payoff value π Y such that P ≤ π Y ≤ R. If P is enforced, it holds that p 0 − wp 0 + wp DD = 0, and hence p DD = p 0 = 0. Therefore, the equalizer is a cautious strategy [32] . If R is enforced, it holds that 1 − p 0 + wp 0 − wp CC = 0, and hence p CC = p 0 = 1. Therefore, the equalizer is a nice strategy [32] . We remark that the equalizer is a ZD strategy for finitely repeated games as defined in Ref. [32] because it satisfies Eq. (31) of [32] with α = 0.
Minimum discount rate
In this section, we identify the condition for w under which equalizer strategies exist. Equation (29) indicates that an equalizer strategy exists if and only if
and
for some 0 ≤ p CC , p DD ≤ 1. Note that we used Eq. (2). Independently of w, any pair of p CC and p DD satisfies the second inequality of Eq. (32) and the first inequality of Eq. (33) because they are satisfied in the most stringent case, i.e., p CC = 1 and p DD = 0. The first inequality of Eq. (32) and the second inequality of Eq. (33) read
and (34) and (35) are shown by the solid and dashed lines, respectively. We set R = 3, T = 5, S = 0, P = 1, and w = 0.8.
respectively. Equations (34) and (35) specify a p CC -p DD region in the square 0 ≤ p CC , p DD ≤ 1, near the corner (p CC , p DD ) = (1, 0) (shaded region in Fig. 1 ). The feasible set (p CC , p DD ) monotonically enlarges as w increases. Therefore, we obtain the condition under which an equalizer exists by substituting p CC = 1 and p DD = 0 in Eqs. (34) and (35), i.e.,
When w = w c , the unique equalizer strategy is given by p CC = 1, p DD = 0, and either p CD or p DC is equal to zero, depending on whether (T − R)/(T − P ) is larger than (P − S)/(R − S) or vice versa. The condition w ≥ (T − R)/(T − P ) in Eq. (36) coincides with that for the GRIM or tit-for-tat strategy to be stable against the unconditional defector [5] . Equation (36) is consistent with the result for the continuous donation game [27] . Their result adapted to the case of two discrete levels of cooperation is w c = c/b, where b and c are the usual benefit and cost parameters in the donation game, respectively. We verify that Eq. (36) with R = b − c, T = b, S = −c, and P = 0 yields w c = c/b.
General cases
All strategies but the equalizer in which a linear relationship is imposed between π X and π Y are given in the form of Eq. (16) . In this section, we derive expressions of X's strategy that realizes Eq. (16) .
By substituting Eqs. (12) and (13) in Eq. (16), we obtain
Equation (37) yields
We set
Then, Eq. (38) is rewritten as
which is equivalent to
Because Eq. (42) must hold true irrespectively of q 0 , we require
Let us denote by u zd,0000 and u zd,1111 the vector u when q = (0, 0, 0, 0) and q = (1, 1, 1, 1), respectively. We obtain
(46) Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eqs. (45) and (46) 
By substituting Eq. (45) in Eq. (44), we obtain
By substituting Eq. (46) in Eq. (43), we obtain
By substituting Eq. (46) in Eq. (44), we obtain
If we assume κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0, we can rewrite Eq. (48) as
If we assume T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0, we can rewrite Eq. (49) as
We will deal with the case κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 or T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0 later in this section. By combining Eqs. (47), (51), and (52), we obtain two types of solutions. The one type of solution is given by
Equation (53) 
which does not contain q. Using Eqs. (7) and (54), we verify Eq. (41). Therefore, Eq. (53) is a set of strategies that impose the linear relationship between the payoff of the two players, i.e., Eq. (16). The strategies given by Eq. (53) are ZD strategies for w < 1 as defined in Ref. [32] , which is verified as follows. Assume that α = 0 in Eq. (31) of [32] because α = 0 corresponds to the equalizer. Then, let us substitute α = φ, β = −φχ, and γ = φ(χ − 1)κ in Eq. (31) of [32] without loss of generality. Note that this transformation is a bijection because (i) φ > 0 and (ii) either χ > 1 or χ < 0 is required for ZD strategies [32] (in the notation of Ref. [32] , φ > 0 and χ < 1 because their χ is defined as the reciprocal of our χ). Then, we obtain
which is equivalent to Eq. (33) of [32] . Equation (55) combined with
is equivalent to Eq. (53). It should also be noted that Eq. (55) extends Eq. (9) of [16] , which has been obtained for w = 1, to general w, R, and P values. The other type of solution that we obtain by combining Eqs. (47), (51), and (52) is given by 
The combination of Eqs. (57) and (58) is equivalent to that of
However, Eqs. (51), (52), (59), and (60) do not provide a sufficient condition for Eq. (41) to hold true for arbitrary q and q 0 . Therefore, we additionally consider the vector u zd when q = (1, 0, 0, 0) and q = (0, 0, 0, 1), which we denote by u zd,1000 and u zd,0001 , respectively. The calculations shown in Appendix A lead to
To verify that the unconditional strategies given by Eq. (61) are a sufficient condition for Eq. (16) to hold true for arbitrary q and q 0 , we substitute Eqs. (59), (60), and (61) in Eq. (40) to obtain
which does not contain q. Using Eqs. (7) and (62), we verify Eq. (41). The unconditional strategy given by Eq. (61) is not a ZD strategy in the sense of [32] unless R + P = T + S (Appendix B), which is the same condition as that for the infinitely repeated game [15] . The obtained solution, i.e., Eq. (61) combined with Eqs. (59) and (60), is equivalent to the previously derived solution for w = 1 [15] . This set of solutions contains the unconditional cooperator and unconditional defector as special cases, and always realizes χ < 0 (Eq. (60)).
When κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0 or T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0, the calculations shown in Appendices C and D reveal the following three types of solutions: (i) a subset of the ZD strategies given by Eq. (53) (Appendix D.2), (ii) a subset of the strategies given by Eq. (61) (Appendices C.1, C.2, and D.2), and (iii) the set of strategies given by To summarize, the set of X's strategies that enforce Eq. (16) is the union of the strategies given by the ZD strategies, Eqs. (53) and (63), and the non-ZD unconditional strategies, Eq. (61). In the next sections, we examine two special cases, which have been studied in the literature, and derive w c in each case.
Extortioner
Expression
The extortioner is defined as a strategy that enforces an extortionate share of payoffs larger than P [9] . We obtain the extortioner by setting κ = P in Eq. (16) . By setting κ = P in Eq. (53), we obtain
Because p DD = −(1 − w)p 0 /w ≥ 0 and w < 1, we obtain p 0 = 0 and p DD = 0, which is consistent with the previously obtained result [32] . Therefore, the extortioner is never the first to cooperate and hence a so-called cautious strategy [32] . By setting p 0 = 0 in Eq. (64), we obtain
3.3.2 Minimum discount rate for χ > 0
By setting κ = P and p 0 = 0 in Eq. (55), we obtain
Because p CC ≤ 1 and w < 1, Eq. (66) implies that φ(χ − 1) > 0 must hold true. We consider the case φ > 0 and χ > 1 in this section and the case φ < 0 and χ < 1 in the next section. When φ > 0, the application of 0 ≤ p CC , p CD , p DC ≤ 1 to Eq. (66) yields (χ − 1)
1 + χ
The condition under which a positive φ value that satisfies Eqs. (67), (68), and (69) exists is given by (χ − 1)
Equation (70) is always satisfied. Equations (71), (72), and (73) yield 
Equation (77) gives the range of χ values for which the extortioner strategy exists. The extortioner is easier to exist for large w in the sense that χ c (w) monotonically decreases as w increases. In particular, we obtain lim w→wc+0 χ c (w) = ∞ and lim w→1 χ c (w) = 1. For a given χ value, the substitution of R = b − c, T = b, S = −c, and P = 0 in Eqs. (36) yields
which is consistent with Eq. (7) of [27] .
Minimum discount rate for χ < 0
Now we consider the case φ < 0 and χ < 1. In this case, we obtain Eqs. (67), (68), and (69), but with all the inequalities flipped (i.e., ≥ instead of ≤). Then, we obtain (χ − 1)
Equations (79)-(82) yield
[
respectively. When w is sufficiently large, the coefficients of χ on the left-hand sides of Eqs. (84), (85), and (86) are positive. In this situation, Eqs. (83)- (86) are satisfied by a sufficiently negative large χ(< 0). This result is consistent with the previously obtained result [32] .
Generous strategy
Expression
The generous strategy, also called compliers, is defined as a strategy that yields a larger shortfall from the mutual cooperation payoff R for the player as compared to that for the co-player [11, 15, 35] . We obtain the generous strategy by setting κ = R in Eq. (16) . By setting κ = R in Eq. (53), we obtain
Because p CC = [1 − (1 − w)p 0 ] /w ≤ 1, we obtain p 0 = 1 and p CC = 1, which is consistent with the previously obtained result [32] . Therefore, the generous strategy is never the first to detect and hence a so-called nice strategy [5, 32] . By setting p 0 = 1 in Eq. (87), we obtain
Minimum discount rate for χ > 0
By applying 0 ≤ p DC , p DD ≤ 1 to Eq. (88), we obtain Figure 2 : Region in the g 1 -g 2 space where the generous strategy exists (shaded region). If (g 1 , g 2 ) is located in this region (e.g., filled circle labeled p CD = 0), the square given by 1/w − 1 ≤ g 1 , g 2 ≤ 1/w intersects the line segment connecting the assumed (g 1 , g 2 ) and the origin. Note that any point on the line segment is realized by the solution by a value of p CD (Eqs. (89) and (90)).
The necessary and sufficient condition for 0 ≤ p CD ≤ 1 that satisfies Eqs. (89) and (90) to exist is given by (Fig. 2 )
In the remainder of this section, we assume χ ≥ 0 and examine the conditions given by Eqs. (93), (94), and (95). First, because dg 1 /dχ > 0, which one can derive using Eq. (3), and g 1 is continuous for χ ≥ 0, Eq. (93) is equivalent to
When w ≤ (T −R)/(T −S), a positive χ value that satisfies Eq. (93) does not exist. Second, because dg 2 /dχ > 0 and g 2 is continuous for χ ≥ 0, Eq. (94) is equivalent to
When w ≤ (T − R)/(T − P ), a positive χ value that satisfies Eq. (94) does not exist. Third, because d(g 2 /g 1 )/dχ > 0 and g 2 /g 1 is continuous for χ ≥ 0, Eq. (95) is equivalent to
When w ≤ (P − S)/(R − S), a positive χ value that satisfies Eq. (95) does not exist. By combining Eqs. (97), (99), and (101), we find that a generous strategy exists if and only if w > w c , where w c is given by Eq. (36). Therefore, the threshold w value above which a ZD strategy exists is the same for the equalizer, extortioner, and generous strategy. It should be noted that w = w c is allowed for the equalizer, but not for the extortioner and the generous strategy. When w > w c , Eq. (98) implies Eq. (96), and hence one obtains
Note that χ c (w) > 1 and χ c (w) decreases as w(> w c ) increases. Equation (102) implies that lim w→wc+0 χ c (w) = ∞ and lim w→1 χ c (w) = 1, which are the same asymptotic as the case of the extortioner.
Minimum discount rate for χ < 0
Now we examine Eqs. (93), (94), and (95) under the assumption that χ < 0. First, because dg 2 /dχ > 0, g 2 is discontinuous at χ = −(R − S)/(T − R), and g 2 < 0 for −(R − S)/(T − R) < χ < 0, Eq. (94) is equivalent to
if w < (T − R)/(T − P ). Second, using Eq. (103), dg 1 /dχ > 0, and that g 1 is discontinuous at χ = −(R − S)/(T − R), we find that Eq. (103) implies Eq. (93) if w ≥ (T − R)/(T − S) and that Eq. (93) is equivalent to
To summarize these results, if w ≥ w c , generous strategies with
exist because Eq. (108) yields Eqs. (93), (94), and (95). This result is consistent with the previously obtained results [32] . Note that we have used Eq. (3) to derive the last inequality in Eq. (108). Even if w < w c , negative χ values that satisfy all the conditions, i.e., the set of equations out of Eqs. (103), (104), (105), (106), and (107), corresponding to the given value of w, may exist.
Conclusions
We analyzed ZD strategies in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with general payoff matrices. Apart from the derivation of the convenient expressions of ZD strategies, the novel results derived in the present article are two-fold. First, we derived the threshold discount factor value, w c , above which the ZD strategies exist for three commonly studied classes of ZD strategies, i.e., equalizer, extortioner, and generous strategies. They all share the same threshold value. Similar to the case of the condition for mutual cooperation in direct reciprocity, ZD strategies can exist only when there are sufficiently many rounds. Second, we showed that the memory-one strategies that impose a linear relationship between the payoff of the two players are either ZD strategies (Eqs. (53) and (63)) or an unconditional strategy (Eq. (61)). The latter class includes the unconditional cooperator and unconditional defector as special cases. Therefore, for finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games (i.e., w < 1), we answered affirmatively to the conjecture posed in [15] . Investigation of the same conjecture for infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games (i.e., w = 1) remains an open question (see Appendix E). We mention possible directions of future research. First, we conjecture that the w c value is the same for all ZD strategies because it takes the same value for the three common ZD strategies. Second, the explicit forms of our solutions (Eqs. (29) and (36)) may be useful for exploring features of ZD strategies in finitely repeated games. For example, investigation of evolutionary dynamics and extensions to multiplayer games, which have been examined for infinitely repeated games (see section 1 for references), in the case of finitely repeated games may benefit from the present results.
Appendix A Derivation of Eq. (61)
In this section, we derive Eq. (61) from Eqs. (59) and (60).
We obtain 43), we obtain
Substitution of Eqs. (51) and (52) in Eq. (110) yields either the third entry of Eq. (53) or
The case in which the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (111) is equal to 0 is covered in Appendices C and D. We note that χ = 1 because χ = 1 substituted in Eq. (60) yields T = S, which contradicts Eq. (2). By combining this observation with 0 < w < 1, we obtain
By substituting Eqs. (59) and (60) in Eq. (112), we obtain the following four possible cases:
, and p 0 = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S − R − P ). First, assume that p 0 = p DC . By substituting p 0 = p DC and Eq. (57) in Eq. (49), we obtain (p CC − p DC ) [T − κ + χ(κ − S)] = 0. Because we have excluded the case T − κ + χ(κ − S) = 0, which we deal with in Appendix C, we obtain p CC = p DC . Therefore, we obtain
Second, assume that p 0 = 1. Substitution of p 0 = 1 in Eq. (59) yields κ = R. Substitution of p 0 = 1 and κ = R in Eq. (52) yields p CC = 1. Substitution of p 0 = 1 in Eq. (60) yields χ = −(R − S)/(T − R). Substitution of p 0 = 1, χ = −(R − S)/(T − R), and κ = R in Eq. (48) yields (1 − p CD )(T − S)(R − P ) = 0, which implies p CD = 1. Therefore, p 0 = 1 combined with Eqs. (59) and (60) results in
Third, we note that
because combination of p 0 = (R − P )/(T + S − R − P ) and 0 ≤ p 0 ≤ 1 leads to T + S − R − P > 0 and 2R ≤ T + S, and the latter inequality contradicts Eq. (3). Fourth, assume that p 0 = (T +S −2P )/(T +S −R−P ). By substituting p 0 = (T +S −2P )/(T +S −R−P ) in Eqs. (59) and (60), we obtain χ = −(P −S)/(T −P ) and κ = P , respectively. Then, we obtain κ−S +χ(T −κ) = 0, which we have decided to deal with later.
To summarize, Eq. (112) leads to either Eq. (113) or (114). We obtain
Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (116) is positive. By substituting Eq. (116) in Eq. (44), we obtain
Substitution of Eqs. (51) and (52) in Eq. (117) yields either the third entry of Eq. (53) or
We examine the case in which the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (118) is zero in Appendices C and D. Therefore, we ignore the denominator and substitute Eqs. (59) and (60) in Eq. (118) to obtain p 0 = p CD , p 0 = 0, p 0 = (R − P )/(T + S − R − P ), or p 0 = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S − R − P ). Among these four possible options, we have excluded p 0 = (R − P )/(T + S − R − P ) and p 0 = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S − R − P ) in the course of the analysis of u zd,1000 . First, assume that p 0 = p CD . By substituting p 0 = p CD and Eq. (58) in Eq. (48), we obtain (p CD − p DD ) [κ − S + χ(T − κ)] = 0. Because we have excluded the case κ − S + χ(T − κ) = 0, which we deal with in Appendix C, we obtain p DD = p CD . Therefore, we obtain Appendix B An unconditional strategy is not a ZD strategy unless
In this section, we show that the unconditional strategy given by Eq. (61) is not a ZD strategy in the sense of [32] if R + P = T + S. By substituting p DC = p DD in Eq. (55), we obtain 
By setting p CC = p CD in Eq. (55) and using φ = 0, we obtain
By combining Eqs. (122) and (123), we obtain
Equation (124) is a sufficient condition for the unconditional strategy to be a ZD because substitution of Eqs. (59), (60), (124) and
in Eq. (55) yields Eq. (61).
In this section, we assume
and derive the set of strategies that satisfy Eq. (16) . By substituting Eq. (126) in Eq. (48), we obtain
Equation (126) does not allow χ = 1 because substitution of χ = 1 in Eq. (126) yields T = S, which contradicts Eq. (2). Substitution of κ = P in Eq. (126) yields χ = −(P − S)/(T − P ). Alternatively, if we set (1 − w)p 0 − 1 + wp CD = 0, we obtain p 0 = p CD = 1. Therefore, we consider the following two subcases, i.e., subcase (A) specified by κ = P
and subcase (B) specified by
C.1 Subcase (A): κ = P and χ = −(P − S)/(T − P )
By substituting Eqs. (128) and (129) in Eq. (47), we obtain
Because T > P > S, 0 < w < 1, and there exists no pair of p CD and p DD (0 ≤ p CD , p DD ≤ 1) that satisfies p CD − p DD = 1/w, we obtain
If we set T + S − R − P = 0, we obtain T + S − 2P = R − P > 0, which contradicts Eq. (133). Therefore, Eq. (133) leads to T + S − R − P = 0, and hence
If T + S − R − P > 0, the condition p 0 ≤ 1 applied to Eq. (134) yields R ≤ P , which contradicts Eq. (2). Therefore, we obtain T + S − R − P < 0 and hence T + S − 2P ≤ 0. By substituting Eqs. (128) and (129) in Eq. (110), we obtain
Substitution of Eq. (134) in Eq. (136) yields
We will deal with the case T + S − 2P = 0 later in this section. Therefore, by assuming T + S − 2P < 0, we obtain
(139) By substituting p 0 = p CC = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S − R − P ) in Eq. (139), we obtain
which leads to
By substituting Eqs. (128) and (129) in Eq. (117), we obtain
If 1 − wp CD − (1 − w)p 0 = 0, we obtain p 0 = p CD = 1, which contradicts Eq. (134). Therefore, Eq. (142) implies
To derive another condition, we need the vector u when player Y adopts the tit-for-tat strategy, i.e., q = (1, 0, 1, 0). This vector, denoted by u zd,1010 , is given by
Note that the denominator on the right-hand side of Eq. (144) 
By substituting κ = P and χ = −(P − S)/(T − P ) in Eq. (145), we obtain
By
If −w(T + S − 2P ) + T + S − R − P = 0, Eq. (134) implies that w = 1/p 0 , i.e., w = p 0 = 1, which contradicts 0 < w < 1. Because we decided to treat the case T + S − 2P = 0 later, Eq. (147), implies
In sum, we obtain p 0 = p CC = p CD = p DC = p DD = (T + S − 2P )/(T + S − R − P ) if T + S − 2P < 0. Substitution of p 0 in Eqs. (59) and (60) yields χ = −(P −S)/(T −P ) and κ = P , respectively, coinciding with the condition for subcase (A). Therefore, the strategy p 0 = p CC = p CD = p DC = p DD = (T +S −2P )/(T +S −R−P ), where T + S − 2P < 0, is a special case of Eq. (61).
Finally, let us consider the case T + S − 2P = 0. By combining this condition with Eq. (134), we obtain p 0 = 0. By substituting T + S − 2P = 0 and p 0 = 0 in Eq. (139), we obtain w(R − P )p DC = 0, which implies that p DC = 0. By substituting T + S − 2P = 0 and p 0 = 0 in Eq. (142), we obtain (1 − wp CD )(R − P )p DD = 0, which implies that p DD = 0. Because p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0, the focal player X never uses p CC and p CD . Therefore, p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 specifies a strategy. By substituting p 0 = 0 in Eqs. (59) and (60) and using T + S − 2P = 0, we obtain χ = −(T − P )/(P − S) = −(P − S)/(T − P ) = −1 and κ = P , respectively, coinciding with the condition for subcase (A). Therefore, the strategy p 0 = p DC = p DD = 0 is a special case of Eq. (61). 
provided that κ = R. We will deal with the case κ = R later in this section. By substituting Eqs. 
which is independent of q. By combining Eqs. (7), (154), and p 0 = 1, we obtain v(0)u zd = 0, i.e., Eq. (41). Therefore, Eq. (63) is a solution that satisfies Eq. (16) .
Finally, let us consider the case κ = R. By substituting κ = R in Eq. (149), we obtain wp CC (R − P ) = w(R − P ), which implies that p CC = 1. By combining this result with Eq. (131), we obtain p 0 = p CC = p CD = 1, which implies that player X never uses p DC and p DD . Therefore, p 0 = p CC = p CD = 1 specifies a strategy. By substituting p 0 = 1 in Eqs. (59) and (60), we obtain χ = −(R − S)/(T − R) and κ = R, respectively, and the former equality coincides with Eq. (131) when κ = R. Therefore, the strategy p 0 = p CC = p CD = 1 is a special case of Eq. (61).
q CD q DC , q CD q DD , q DC q DD , q CC , q CD , q DC , q DD , and 1, has to be 0. These conditions respectively yield 
Equations ( (1) in [15] ) and p = (r, r, r, r) (0 ≤ r ≤ 1) [15] satisfy these eight equations for some α, β, and γ.
